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Abstract Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while
others seem fine. Some proponents of the view that indicative conditionals
have No Truth Values (NTV) use their view to explain why some left-nestings
are hard to interpret: the embedded conditional does not express the truth
conditions needed by the embedding conditional. Left-nestings that seem fine
are then explained away as cases of ad hoc, pragmatic interpretation. We
challenge this explanation. The standard reasons for NTV about indicative
conditionals (triviality results, Gibbardian standoffs, etc.) extend naturally
to NTV about biconditionals. So NTVers about conditionals should also be
NTVers about biconditionals. But biconditionals embed much more freely
than conditionals. If NTV explains why some left-nested conditionals are hard
to interpret, why do biconditionals embed successfully in the very contexts
where conditionals do not embed?
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1 Introduction
Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while others
seem fine.1 Gibbard [6] famously offers the following, said of a conference,
as an example of troublesome left-nesting:
(1) *If Kripke was there if Strawson was there, Anscombe was there.2
In contrast, the following example seems unproblematic:
(2) If the cup broke if it was dropped, it was fragile.
The difference between (1) and (2) poses an explanatory puzzle, one we might
expect our semantic theory of indicative conditionals to solve.
One prominent view is that indicative conditionals do not have truth values
(NTV) because they do not express propositions. When I say that if Sergio
makes coffee then he’ll spill some, I may express an epistemic attitude or condi-
tionally assert something, but I do not assert anything unconditionally that can
properly be evaluated for truth or falsity. According to some proponents of this
view, like Gibbard [6], Edgington [5] and Bennett [2], (1) is uninterpretable
because the nested conditional Kripke was there if Strawson was there does
not express truth conditions in a context where they are expected, and the
result is semantic defectiveness. While the nested the cup broke if it was
dropped likewise fails to express truth conditions where expected, (2) can still
be interpreted by ad hoc, pragmatic means. When we hear (2), we substitute
for the embedded conditional a factual basis that would make the embedded
conditional assertable, e.g. the cup was disposed to break upon falling. So when
we hear (2), we understand it as saying something to the effect of:
(3) If the cup was disposed to break upon falling, it was fragile.
On this view, the default expectation is that a left-nested conditional will not
be interpretable, but pragmatics can salvage it when an ad hoc interpretation
is available.
We want to challenge this way of handling the explanatory puzzle posed
by (1) and (2). The crux of our challenge will be that the standard reasons to
hold NTV about conditionals are likewise reasons to hold NTV about bicon-
ditionals, yet biconditionals embed much more freely than conditionals. In
particular, if and only if embeds successfully in the very contexts where
embedding if/then makes for apparent uninterpretability. Since NTVers should
be equally NTVist about if and only if, they should expect if and only if to
1The right-nested form A→(B→C) is typically thought not to exhibit this puzzling phenomenon,
and so will not be discussed.
2Notice that interpretability is not helped if we move to the if if A then B, then C formulation,
instead of the if A if B, then C formulation that Gibbard uses. We will follow Gibbard and others
in focusing on the if A if B, then C formulation here and in subsequent examples. Readers who are
concerned that something may hang on this choice should check to their satisfaction that there is
no significant difference in each instance.
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display a similar pattern of (un)interpretability. So why does if and only if
embed where if/then does not?
A clarificatory note before we begin: some NTVers endorse theories that
do freely allow left-nesting.3 These NTVers will presumably attribute (1)’s
difficulty to something besides a failure to have truth conditions where ex-
pected, so they are not our target. Our target is not the NTV view itself but,
rather, the use of NTV to explain (1)’s difficulty.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews some well-known arguments
for NTV about conditionals and shows how they extend to biconditionals.
Section 3 argues that if and only if embeds much more freely than if/then;
most importantly, it embeds in the very same sentences where if/then does not
embed. Section 4 closes with a brief discussion of the import of these results.
2 Arguments for NTV
Why think that indicative conditionals do not have truth values? Many rea-
sons have been given but we will focus on two: Lewis’s triviality result and
Gibbardian standoffs. In each case, we claim, the argument readily extends to
biconditionals. We will also briefly consider how two further arguments, due
to Edgington and Bradley, can be similarly extended. In all four cases we will
treat the original assumptions and steps uncritically, showing only how they
extend to the case of biconditionals.
Lewis [10] showed that the probability of a conditional A→B is always
trivialized, given the plausible assumption that the probability of a conditional
is always the same as the corresponding conditional probability. Following
Edgington, we label this assumption:4
The Equation p(A→B) = p(B|A) for any A and B.
Given The Equation, it follows that p(A→B) = p(B) for any A and B, which
is absurd. But this result can be blocked if we accept NTV. If A→B does not
express a proposition, then p(A→B) is not the probability of a proposition
to which the laws of probability can be applied. Instead, p(A→B) is the
acceptability of the conditional A→B.5 The triviality result thus supports
NTV, since NTV allows us to avoid absurdity while retaining The Equation.
To extend the argument to biconditionals we must add to The Equation
some further assumption about the probabilities of biconditionals. There are
several ways to go here.
3See [1], [7], and [9].
4The class of probability functions over which p ranges is assumed, here and in the remainder of
our discussion of triviality results, to be closed under conditioning.
5Some interpret The Equation as presupposing that A→B expresses a proposition. For them the
NTV response is framed differently: The Equation is rejected, but its appeal is preserved in the
thesis that the assertability of a conditional matches the corresponding conditional probability.
452 A. Sennet, J. Weisberg
One natural way to go is to assume that the probability of a biconditional is
always the probability of a conjunction of conditionals. There are two natural
candidates here, the first being:
The Biquation p(B↔A) = p((A→B) ∧ (B→A)) for any A, B.
But there is also the alternative:
The Other Biquation p(B↔A) = p((A→B) ∧ (¬A→¬B)) for any
A, B.
Some hold that indicative conditionals do not contrapose, in which case The
Other Biquation is not equivalent to The Biquation. So we must consider both
proposals.
A word of caution: neither The Biquation nor The Other Biquation should
be taken to presuppose an analysis of the biconditional as a conjunction of
conditionals. These equalities merely say that the probability of a biconditional
is always the same as the probability of the corresponding conjunction of
conditionals. It does not follow that the biconditional is shorthand for, or is
logically or analytically equivalent to, the corresponding conjunction.
Both The Biquation and The Other Biquation lead to absurdity. The
conjunction of The Equation and The Biquation entails that p(B↔A) =
p(A ∧ B) for any A, B. And the conjunction of The Equation and The Other
Biquation entails that p(B↔A) = 0 for any A, B. (See the Appendix for
proofs.) As with Lewis’s triviality result, the proofs here turn on being able to
assign probabilities to biconditionals, so NTV about biconditionals can again
be used to avoid absurdity. If B↔A does not express a proposition, we cannot
treat p(B↔A) as the probability of a proposition to which the usual laws of
probability apply. So these triviality results support NTV about biconditionals
if Lewis’s result supports NTV about conditionals.
The Biquation and The Other Biquation are plausible assumptions from a
naive standpoint, but they hit a snag in the context of the current dialectic. We
are trying to show that NTVers about → should be NTVist about ↔ too. But,
from the point of view of the NTVer about →, assumptions like The Biquation
and The Other Biquation are problematic, since they attribute probabilities to
embeddings of →. The crux of the NTVer’s argument from Lewis-triviality is
that such attributions are to be regarded with suspicion, so she will likely reject
assumptions like The (Other) Biquation. This snag motivates approaching
↔-triviality from a second angle.
All one really needs to run the triviality proof for ↔ is an assumption about
the probability of a biconditional when the probability of a corresponding
conditional is extreme (either 0 or 1). For example, rather than assume The
Biquation, we can assume merely that
p(B↔A) =
{
0 if p(A→B) = 0,
p(B→A) if p(A→B) = 1. (4)
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Similarly, rather than assume The Other Biquation, we can just assume that
p(B↔A) =
{
0 if p(A→B) = 0,
p(¬A→¬B) if p(A→B) = 1. (5)
These assumptions yield the same triviality results as The Biquation and The
Other Biquation respectively. (Again, see the Appendix for proofs.)
These weaker assumptions can be motivated much like The (Other) Bi-
quation was motivated, but without appealing to embeddings that are prob-
lematic from the NTV point of view. A driving thought behind both pairs
of assumptions is that one’s confidence in a biconditional should depend on,
or at least be linked to, one’s confidence in the corresponding conditionals.
For example, it would be strange to be highly confident that B↔A when one
lacks confidence in both A→B and B→A (assuming for the moment that the
relevant conditionals are B→A and A→B). But we needn’t assume that this
connection obeys the rules of the probability calculus for ∧ in general. All we
need to assume is that the extreme cases work as one would naturally expect.
In the extreme case where there is absolutely no chance that A→B, having
any confidence at all in B↔A seems unreasonable, so p(B↔A) = 0. And in
the extreme case where A→B is absolutely certain, one’s only doubts about
B↔A should be one’s doubts about B→A, so p(B↔A) = p(B→A). So even
if the NTVer is reluctant to assign probabilities to conjunctions of conditionals
for theoretical reasons, the pre-theoretic appeal of The Biquation can still be
translated into motivation for Eq. 4. And, similarly, the pre-theoretic appeal
of The Other Biquation can be translated into motivation for Eq. 5.
Standoffs have also been taken to support NTV about conditionals [6].
Standoffs are cases where two subjects believe contrary conditionals, yet
neither appears to believe falsely. Here is an example from Bennett [2, p. 85].
Top Gate holds back a lake from a channel that splits in two directions, east
and west. There are two levers, East Lever and West Lever, controlling which
way the water runs when Top Gate is open. If East Lever is down, any water
coming down the channel runs east, and similarly for West Lever. If both
levers are down, Top Gate cannot be opened. One observer sees that West
Lever is down and believes The water will run west if Top Gate opens. Another
sees that East Lever is down and thinks The water will run east if Top Gate
opens. By conditional non-contradiction, they cannot both believe truly, and
the symmetry of the situation forbids saying that one believes truly and the
other falsely. Could they both believe falsely? Then they would have to be
mistaken about some relevant fact, which it seems they are not: each draws
her conclusion from true premises by good reasoning, overlooking nothing and
possibly even suspecting the complete truth about the situation. Apparently
what these agents believe is neither true nor false, as NTV predicts.
This argument extends to biconditionals without changing the example.
Because the water cannot run either direction without Top Gate opening, each
observer should believe that the water will run in her direction only if Top Gate
opens. So the observer in the east is entitled to believe The water will run east
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if and only if Top Gate opens, and similarly for the observer in the west. The
two observers are thus entitled to contrary biconditionals, and assigning truth
values is just as fraught as before. NTV escapes the problem, however, and
thus garners support.
There are many other arguments for NTV about conditionals, and we sus-
pect that many of them can be similarly extended to biconditionals. In general,
we conjecture, only minimal assumptions need to be added, and those as-
sumptions either follow naturally from the original assumptions or else can be
motivated in much the same way as the original assumptions. We will briefly
outline two more examples to illustrate.
Edgington’s [5, pp. 278–80] argument for NTV about conditionals extends
quite naturally to biconditionals. Adapting Bennett’s presentation of the
argument to the case of biconditionals, we begin with the premises:
(P1) Being certain that (A ∧ B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B), without being certain of
either A ∧ B or ¬A ∧ ¬B, is sufficient for being certain that B↔A.
(P2) It is not necessarily irrational to disbelieve both A and B, yet also
disbelieve B↔A.
If biconditionals have truth values, (P2) tells us that it is possible for B↔A to
be false while A and B are both false, i.e. while (A ∧ B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B) is true.
But then certainty in (A ∧ B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B) could not entitle one to certainty
in B↔A, as (P1) says. The contradiction is blocked by NTV, however, since it
forbids concluding from (P2) that B↔A can be false while A and B are both
false, since B↔A cannot be false at all.
The following argument is an adaptation of Bennett’s presentation of
Bradley’s [4] argument.6 Our assumptions are:
(P3) For any propositions Q, R, and S such that neither Q nor R entails S, it
can be that p(Q) > 0, p(R) > 0, and p(S) = 0.
(P4) It is never the case that p(A) > 0 and p(B↔A) > 0 and yet p(B) = 0.
Typically neither A nor B↔A entails B, so (P3) says it should be possible
to assign non-zero probability to A and to B↔A but zero probability to
B. But this is precisely what (P4) forbids. Once again, NTV can block the
contradiction by saying that (P3) does not apply to B↔A, since it does not
express a (truth-evaluable) proposition.
3 Embeddability
Oddly and unexpectedly, if and only if embeds successfully in those condition-
als where if/then does not. Consider the following parallel to Gibbard’s (1):
(6) If Kripke was there if and only if Strawson was there, Anscombe was
there.
6The adaptation is trivial in a way: all one must do is verify that Bradley’s (P4) holds for ↔ as well
as for →. Nevertheless, we reproduce the argument in compact form here for completeness.
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(6) is unwieldy. (6) is awkward. Few people would ever put what (6) expresses
by uttering (6). Nonetheless, it is not difficult to interpret.7 Notice also that
(6)’s cognate:
(7) If Kripke was there just in case Strawson was there, Anscombe was there.
is equally interpretable.
It is no fluke that (6) is better than (1). Here are a few more pairs to
illustrate:
(8) ?If Jimmy has a cat if he has a dog, then he has a parrot.
(9) If Jimmy has a cat if and only if he has a dog, then he has a parrot.
and
(10) ?If Mary has tuberculosis if the test paper shows green, they are testing
for the lethal kind.
(11) If Mary has tuberculosis if and only if the test paper shows green, they
are testing for the lethal kind.
In each of these pairs, the latter example is significantly more acceptable than
the former.8
To further contrast (6) with (1), we can consider what inferences one would
be willing to draw from each with collateral information. Consider:
A: If Kripke was there if Strawson was there, Anscombe was there.
B: Anscombe wasn’t there.
It is difficult to know what to conclude from these premises, and the difficulty
is exacerbated by an old problem noted by theorists of conditionals: that a
negation over a conditional tends to get read as a negation of the consequent
[5, p. 283]. In contrast, however, consider:
A′: If Kripke was there if and only if Strawson was there, Anscombe was
there.
B: Anscombe wasn’t there.
It is entirely reasonable here to conclude that it’s not the case that Kripke was
there if and only if Strawson was.
It is tempting to dismiss (6) on the grounds that the biconditional is a term of
art we learn in logic class when we learn the material biconditional. But even if
if and only if is not a part of colloquial English, it is a part of academic English,
7Both authors have given this paper several times and run the sample sentences by philosophers,
linguists, and laypeople; the contrast between (1) and (6) was robust in all cases.
8Most of our audience members found that neither (8) nor (10) was quite as bad as (1). But
neither was deemed acceptable either, whereas (9) and (11) were. The difficulty finding examples
as bad as (1) corroborates our view (see Section 4 below) that (1)’s badness is not due to semantic
defectiveness, but something more idiosyncratic and superficial.
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and it is false that it is academic English for the material biconditional. The
material biconditional:
(12) The Toronto Maple Leafs won the 1978 Stanley Cup ≡ the price of milk
was $99 per liter that year.
is true because both sides are false, but the English biconditional:
(13) The Toronto Maple Leafs won the 1978 Stanley Cup if and only if the
price of milk was $99 per liter that year.
is intuitively false. Indeed, the obvious conjecture that a biconditional B if and
only if A is intuitively true only if both B if A and B only if A are, is very
reliable. So it is no surprise that ↔ cannot be analyzed as ≡. At least, analyzing
↔ as ≡ will be no more successful than analyzing → as ⊃, and the NTVer
presumably finds the latter analysis unsatisfactory.
4 Discussion
We have argued that biconditionals embed in conditionals where conditionals
do not, yet NTVers about conditionals should also be NTVers about bicondi-
tionals. We think this is bad news for the NTV explanation of the badness of
Gibbard’s (1). We will briefly suggest an alternative explanation in a moment,
but we want address two worries first.
The first worry is that we were too quick in concluding that NTVers about
if/then should also be NTVers about if and only if. Sometimes a reason to think
P and Q lack truth values doesn’t translate into a reason to think P ∧ Q lacks
a truth value. For example:
(14) Holmes was tall
might lack a truth value because we can assign it true or false consistent with
all that Doyle wrote. And likewise for:
(15) Holmes was not tall.
Yet:
(16) Holmes was tall and Holmes was not tall.
is surely false. So just because something is a reason for NTV about if/then and
about only if does not mean it is a reason for NTV about if and only if.9
To assuage this worry, we just have to look at the specifics of our argu-
ments for NTV about if and only if. In the Holmes example, an argument
for NTV about P and Q has true premises, but the analogous premise in
the corresponding argument for NTV about P ∧ Q is false. To ensure that
our arguments do not make the same mistake, we just have to check that
9We are grateful to Alan Hájek here.
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the new premises are true—or, at least, that the reasons NTVers have for
endorsing the premises of their arguments are equally reasons for endorsing
the premises of our arguments. And this has been done. In our extension of
the argument from Lewis’s triviality result, for example, we argued that the
additional assumptions Eqs. 4 and 5 should be amenable to the proponent of
the original argument. Of course, the NTVer could allow that the premises of
our arguments are true and insist that the reasoning is defeated in the case
of if and only if in a way that the reasoning about if/then is not. But we do not
see any reason to think this is so, and the burden is on NTVers to show that it
is.
The second worry is that one might accept NTV about both conditionals and
biconditionals, yet expect them to display different patterns of embedability.
After all, sentences like (14) might lack truth values, but we don’t expect
any trouble embedding them. Merely lacking a truth value isn’t enough for
a prediction of infelicitous embedding.10
But NTV about sentences like (14) has a very different source: it is under-
determination of truth value, as opposed to unavailability of semantic type
for assertion, that is the source of truth-valuelessness. Since the sentence is
truth-apt, we should expect a different profile of embeddings comparable
to whatever we give to underdetermination of truth value in general. For
example, supervaluationism and some three valued logics predict that (16) will
express a falsehood, as will
(17) John believes that Holmes is tall.
Nothing comparable happens with conditionals and biconditionals, where the
source of truth-valuelessness is the hypothesis that they don’t express proposi-
tions at all.
We conclude that the badness of (1) is not to be explained by appeal to
NTV. We will close by mentioning a possible alternative.
There are cases of perfectly meaningful sentences that are nevertheless hard
to interpret, most famously “garden path” sentences like:
(18) The horse raced past the barn fell.11
Sentence (18) sounds awfully bad, until understood as:
(19) The horse that was raced past the barn fell.
A different sort of example is Miller and Chomsky’s [11]:
(20) The rat the cat the dog chased ate died.
10Here again we are grateful to Alan Hájek.
11The example is from [3].
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Sentence (20) is generally regarded as syntactically and semantically well-
formed, yet intuitively unacceptable due to limitations of the human parser
[8].12
Perhaps there is something similar at work in cases like (1). This suggestion
gains support from the fact that it is somewhat difficult to understand similar
sentences,13 such as:
(21) ?Because Mary came because Sheila came, Steve came.
Compare (21) with:
(22) Because Mary came because and only because Sheila came, Steve came.
Sentence (22) is not easily understood but, despite its clumsy structuring, it is
understandable. These observations suggest that the badness of (1) is better
explained by parsing difficulties than by semantic defectiveness.14
One might object that parsing difficulties could not explain the difference
between Gibbard’s (1) and our (6), since (1) is syntactically simpler. But
syntactic simplicity does not closely track ease of parsing. (18) is not easily
parsed, yet:
(23) The horse slaughtered behind the barn fell.
is syntactically comparable and is easily parsed. The reason is clear: slaughtered
doesn’t plausibly take an agentive argument in this context since it would be
transitive and there is no patient to play the role. The human parser is guided
and misguided by semantic as well syntactic complexity.
A better question, we think, is why (1) would trip up a parser while (2) fails
to cause similar problems. We aren’t sure. It’s tempting to think that repetition
of the same verb in the same structure does the trick, but this depends on just
how uninterpretable (21) is. Our best guess is that left-dislocated clauses that
begin with connectives like if/then or because cause scope trouble when one
tries to reconstruct them.15
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Appendix: Triviality Results for Biconditionals
The Biquation entails Eq. 4 and The Other Biquation entails Eq. 5, so it
will suffice to show that the weaker assumptions Eqs. 4 and 5 each lead to
a triviality result.
Claim 1 Given The Equation and Eq. 4, p(B↔A) = p(A ∧ B) for any A, B.
Proof Assume The Equation and Eq. 4, and let pφ(·) be the probability
function obtained from p by conditionalizing on φ.
Lewis showed that, given The Equation, the probability of a conditional is
always the probability of its consequent, from which it follows immediately
that pB(A→B) = 1. By Eq. 4 then,
pB(B↔A) = pB(B→A).





From Lewis’s result we also have p¬B(A→B) = 0, so Eq. 4 gives us
p¬B(B↔A) = 0.
Applying the law of total probability then, we have
p(B↔A) = p(B↔A|B)p(B) + p(B↔A|¬B)p(¬B)
= pB(B↔A)p(B) + p¬B(B↔A)p(¬B)
= p(A|B)p(B)
= p(A ∧ B).
	unionsq
Claim 2 Given The Equation and Eq. 5, p(B↔A) = 0 for any A, B.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 1, except that now both
pB(B↔A) and p¬B(B↔A) are 0. The reason for p¬B(B↔A) = 0 is the same
as before: Lewis and The Equation tell us that p¬B(A→B) = 0, so Eq. 5 tells us
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that p¬B(B↔A) = 0. As for pB(B↔A), The Equation gives us pB(A→B) = 1,
so Eq. 5 yields
pB(B↔A) = pB(¬A→¬B).
And since The Equation tells us pB(¬A→¬B) = 0, we have
pB(B↔A) = 0.
Thus, when we apply the law of total probability to p(B↔A), both summands
are 0:
p(B↔A) = p(B↔A|B)p(B) + p(B↔A|¬B)p(¬B)
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